Sandrine Blanc

This article asks whether firms should contribute to the costs of procreation and parenthood. We explore two sets of arguments. First, we ask what the principle of fair play – central in parental justice debates – implies. We argue that if one defends a prosharing view, firms are required to shoulder part of the costs of procreation and parenthood. Second, we turn to the principle of fair equality of opportunity. We argue that compensating firms for costs they incur because their employees decide to procreate or parent may undermine some of the incentives leading to (statistical) discrimination in the workplace.

This conceptual article proposes a new framework for examining ideologies in management. While ideology is depicted in social sciences as a coherent set of ideas, a whole body of literature in organization underlines the great flexibility of individual practices. It therefore seems necessary to specify ideology as an ideal substrate with a divisible content, and to establish the mediating concept of ideological repertoire, an individual catalogue of various ideological items strategically mobilized by the members of organizations. This extended framework raises some theoretical and empirical implications that are discussed here.

Cet article conceptuel propose un nouveau cadre de lecture des idéologies en management. Alors que l’idéologie est dépeinte en sciences sociales comme un socle cohérent d’idées, tout un pan de la littérature en organisation souligne la grande flexibilité des pratiques individuelles. Aussi apparaît-il nécessaire de préciser l’idéologie comme un substrat idéel au contenu sécable, et de poser le concept médiateur de répertoire idéologique, catalogue individuel d’items idéologiques mobilisés de façon stratégique par les membres organisationnels. Ce cadre de lecture étendu soulève des implications théoriques et empiriques qui sont ici discutées.

Abstract

Singer has recently argued that questions related to corporate governance are beyond the reach of Rawls’s political conception of justice. This is because justice applies to the basic structure of society, understood as society’s legally coercive structures, and because corporate governance cannot be considered part of this structure in political liberalism. This commentary challenges the second part of the argument. First, it suggests that the criterion used to exclude corporate governance from the basic structure—whether employees can exit economic organizations—is not conclusive for corporate governance, notably as institutionalized in corporate law. Second, even if the focus were on corporate governance, it would still be possible to argue that it legally coerces citizens, if not employees, in a relevant way. Thus, the argument is not successful in demonstrating that political liberalism goes beyond its legitimate boundaries when considering that aspects of corporate governance may be matters of justice.